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prosecution is exercising its peremptory challenges to acquire a fair and
impartial jury, not for racially discriminatory purposes. This presumption, however, can be overcome when the defendant shows that the
prosecution has systematically challenged prospective jurors on the
basis of race. 53 Swain, therefore, provides defense counsel with a legal
basis for establishing an Equal Protection Clause claim for racially
discriminatory practices by the prosecution through evidence of specific
acts over time.

53

54
Intentional discrimination based on race is reprehensible. It is
even more so where the life of the accused is at stake. Counsel should not
hesitate in an appropriate case to undertake the issues and questions
authorized by Swain.

Summary and analysis by:
Deborah A. Hill

54

Id. at 223-24.

See case summary of Hoke, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.

MUELLER v. MURRAY
252 Va. 356,478 S.E.2d 542 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
HOLDING
In the early morning hours of October 6, 1990, ten year old Charity
Powers was abducted from a fast food restaurant near the skating rink
where her mother had earlier dropped her off. Her body was found the
following February buried 900 feet from the home of Everett Lee
Mueller. During interrogation, Mueller confessed to enticing Powers
into his car with the promise of a ride home; instead, he took her to his
house. Mueller claimed that Powers consented to sex with him and that
afterwards he strangled her to keep her from reporting the incident. The
state's evidence, however, tended to prove that Powers was raped and
that her throat had been slit.1
The jury found Mueller guilty of capital murder, rape, and abduction
with intent to defile.2 At the sentencing phase of the trial, four women,
including Mueller's sister, testified that they had been raped by Mueller.
Mueller had been convicted of two of these rapes. Mueller's own expert
testified that he lacked a "working conscience." 3 Mueller was sentenced
to death based upon the jury's finding of both "vileness" and "future
4
dangerousness."
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment, 5 and the
United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. 6 Mueller then
petitioned for state habeas relief; his petition was dismissed in part and
denied in part. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted review but limited
it to the issue of whether Mueller's constitutional rights were violated by
the trial court's refusal to inform the jury that Mueller would be
7
ineligibile for parole if he received a life sentence.

The decision in Teague was intended, in the interest of finality and
federal-state comity, to prevent application of "new" rules of criminal
procedure to defendants whose convictions were final before the new
rule was announced.11 The Supreme Court stated that "a case announces
a'new 'rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final." 12 Teague requires a three step
analysis: first, determining whether the defendant's conviction became
final before the date on which the new rule was announced; second,
surveying the legal landscape as of the date of final conviction to
determine whether a state court examining the issue at that time would
have felt compelled by precedent to conclude that the rule was constitutionally required; and finally, the court must decide whether the new rule
falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the Teague doctrine.

I Mueller v. Murray, 252 Va. 356,358-60,478 S.E.2d 542,544-45
(1996),
2
1d. at 360,478 S.E.2d at 545. The capital murder convictions were
based upon Va. Code § 18.2-31(5) (murder in commission of a rape) and
former Va. Code § 18.2-31(8) (murder of child under 12 in the commission of an abduction with intent to defile).
3
Id.
4Id.
5Muellerv. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386,414,422 S.E.2d 380, 398
(1992).
6
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993).
7Muellerv. Murray,252 Va. 356,358,478 S.E.2d 542,544 (1996).

8512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994) (ruling that the defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the state's evidence of future dangerousness with
the fact that the defendant would be parole ineligible if sentenced to life
instead of death).
9489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (finding that habeas prisoners generally
not entitled to benefit of new favorable Supreme Court decisions).
1
OMueller, 252 Va. at 367,478 S.E.2d at 549.
11 Id. at 361, 478 S.E.2d at 546 (explaining that Teague and its
progeny have determined that the defendant's conviction becomes final
on the date of denial of certiorari or of other final disposition by the
United States Supreme Court).
12 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina8 was a "new rule"under
Teague v. Lane,9 and that consequently Mueller was not entitled to the
benefit of the Simmons holding. The court affirmed the lower court's
denial of Mueller's petition. 10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
1.

Teague Analysis
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Because Mueller was denied a rehearing on his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1993, that is the date
of"finality" for Teague purposes. 13 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia
surveyed the legal landscape as of that date. Rather than conduct a fresh
survey of their own, however, the court essentially adopted the Fourth
Circuit's recent 7-6 decision in O'Dell v. Netherland.14 In O'Dell, the
court of appeals addressed the question of whether Simmons was a new
rule for Teague purposes. 15 The court of appeals first defined the"rule"
of Simmons narrowly: "where the State puts the defendant's future
dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to
death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process
entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury-by either
16
argument or instruction-that he is parole ineligible."
The O'Dell court found that three United States Supreme Court
opinions, Gardnerv. Florida,17 Skipper v. South Carolina,18 and California v. Ramos, 19 constituted the "legal landscape" prior to Simmons.
The majority found that Ramos left the question of parole ineligibility to
state law. Additionally, the court found that the Ramos holding made the
apparently contrary holdings in Gardnerand Skipper at least ambiguous
enough that a state court would not have felt compelled to find the
Simmons rule.
Relying heavily on O'Dell,the court inMuellerruledthat Simmons
was not a new rule for purposes of Virginia law. This holding is an
interesting example of"reverse comity"-a state court adopting a federal
court decision as its own. Ironically, one of the purposes of the Teague
doctrine was to encourage federal courts to respect state court opinions.
Once the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Simmons was a new
rule, Mueller was not entitled to its benefit on appeal unless the court
found that Simmons was an exception to the Teague doctrine. As the court
noted, if Simmons established a so-called "watershed" rule of criminal
procedure, one in which the holding was fundamental to civil liberties,
the Teague doctrine would not apply and the rule of Simmons could be
applied retroactively to Mueller on appeal. 20 The court summarily
dismissed the argument that Simmons is a "watershed" rule, suggesting
only that it obviously was not as "ground breaking" as Gideon v.

13 Mueller, 252 Va. at 362, 478 S.E.2d at 546.
14 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996). The United States Supreme Court
granted O'Dell's petition for writ of certiorari on the Teague issue on
December 17, 1996. O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S.Ct. 631 (1996). Oral
arguments were heard on March 18, 1997.
15 For a much more thorough examination of O'Dell and of the
argument that Simmons is not a new rule, as well as the alternative
argument, also made by Mueller, that Simmons is a "watershed" rule, see
case summary of O'Dell,Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1,p. 29
(1996).
16
O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Simmons, 114 S.Ct. at 2201
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
17 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding that sentencing court had violated
defendant's constitutional rights when it relied upon a secret report that
defendant never had the opportunity to rebut).
18 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that exclusion of evidence that
defendant adjusted well to incarceration violates Lockett v. Ohio).

21
Wainwright,which granted the right to counsel to indigent defendants.
Perhaps, however, the court should have taken this portion of Mueller's
argument more seriously. It is not altogether obvious why a rule that a
defendant is entitled to have an attorney speak for him in court is
fundamental to due process (Gideon) while a rule that a defendant may
tell the jury with or without the assistance of counsel that he is ineligible
for parole is not (Simmons). Put another way, Simmons was grounded in
a fundamental due process right to contest the state's case for death. So
why is that right less important than the right to exercise it, and other
rights, through counsel? The argument at least deserved a more thorough
analysis than the Mueller and O'Dellcourts accorded it.

II.

Beyond O'Dell - Is Parole Ineligibility Mitigation?

More important than the Supreme Court of Virginia's adoption of
O'Dell'sanalysis of Simmons, however, is the fact that Mueller raised a
Simmons-based argument that was not addressed by the Fourth Circuit
in O'Dell. Mueller argued that the trial court's refusal to allow him to
inform the jury of his parole ineligibility violated not only his right to
rebut "future dangerousness" (see Justice O'Connor's "narrow" interpretation of Simmons, infra), but also violated his Eighth Amendment
right to present evidence in mitigation. It has never been authoritively
decided whether parole ineligibility is mitigation evidence. If it is, such
a claim may not be barred by the rule of Teaguebecause it has long been
held that a defendant has a constitutional right to present any evidence to
the jury which is mitigating. 22 Unfortunately, the court ruled that this
argument was procedurally barred because Mueller did not raise it on
direct appeal. 23 If parole ineligibility is mitigation (it tends to show that
a life sentence is severe and sufficient punishment), then defense counsel
must be permitted to communicate it to the jury in all capital cases,
regardless of which aggravating factor Virginia relied upon to make the
24
defendant eligible for the death sentence.
Summary and Analysis by:
Daryl Rice

19 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (holding that California law requiring
instruction as to governor's power to commute life sentence without
possibility of parole did not violate Constitution).
20
Mueller, 252 Va. at 366, 478 S.E.2d at 549.
21
Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
22
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
23
Mueller,252 Va. at 367,478 S.E.2d at 549. For an examination
of Virginia's default and waiver rules see Groot, To Attain the Ends of
Justice: Confronting Virginia'sDefaultRules in CapitalCases,Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 44 (1994).
24 Note that even the "narrow" interpretation of Simmons requires
that parole ineligibility be allowed to be argued to the jury whenever
"future dangerousness" is an issue at sentencing. It is hard to imagine a
capital case where "future dangerousness" would not be an issue at
sentencing, even if the Commonwealth formally relied only upon
"vileness."

